

Reliability Mechanisms for Very Large Storage Systems

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Outline

- ◆ Motivations and Goals
- ◆ Reliability Mechanisms
 - Signature scheme
 - Fast recovery schemes
- ◆ System Reliability Analysis
 - Size of a redundancy set
 - Mean-Time-To-Data-Loss of the system
- ◆ Conclusions & Future Work




Concerns for System Reliability

- ◆ Why are systems getting less reliable?
 - Complex computer components
 - Human errors
 - More components in large computer systems
- ◆ Impacts of system unreliability
 - Long down time
 - Increasing repair costs and Total Cost of Ownership
 - Frequent data loss




Reliability Challenges in Large Storage Systems

- ◆ More storage devices
 - High Performance vs. Low Reliability
- ◆ Larger disk capacity
 - Increase in disk capacity outpaces that of bandwidth
 - Disk rebuild time gets longer
- ◆ Goal: reduce the risk of data loss
- ◆ Main causes of data loss
 - Nonrecoverable Read Errors
 - Disk Failures



Object Based Storage System



- ◆ Petabyte scale
- ◆ Object-based storage management
- ◆ Deep concerns for data loss
 - Thousands of disks
 - Huge capacity



Cause I: Nonrecoverable Read Errors

- ◆ What is it?
 - Sector corruptions on disks and data cannot be read correctly.
 - Error rate: 1 in 10^{13} to 10^{15} bits
- ◆ Why do we care?
 - Increase in total data capacity and total system bandwidth
 - Once per year for a typical disk
 - Once per hour for the OBSD system
- ◆ Data corruption is not tolerable for storage systems



Solution: Signature Scheme

- ◆ A signature associated with each data block
 - Fixed-length: 8 or 16 bits
 - If ($\text{Signature}_{\text{new}} \neq \text{Signature}_{\text{prev}}$), then flag an error.
 - Sources of errors
 - Data block error
 - Corrupted signature
- ◆ Data reconstruction
 - Replication
 - Parity
 - Erasure coding ...



Cause II: Disk Failures

- ◆ Why we care? -- More frequent
 - 1 per 10^5 hours (11.4 years) for a single disk
 - For a system with thousands of disks, we might experience one disk failure per day.
- ◆ Why not just RAID?
 - Long disk rebuild time
 - The window of vulnerability gets wider.
 - To rebuild a 500 GB disk requires one day assuming rebuild rate is 5MB/sec.
 - MTDDL (Mean Time To Data Loss) = 3 years for a 2-Petabyte storage system.




Solution: Reliability Mechanisms

- ◆ Redundancy set
 - A block group composed of data blocks and their associated replicas or parity blocks
- ◆ Configurations
 - 2-way mirroring (Mirror-2)
 - 3-way mirroring (Mirror-3)
 - RAID5+mirroring (RAID51)
- ◆ Fast Recovery Schemes
 - Fast Mirroring Copy
 - Lazy Parity Backup




Redundancy Set Configurations


Mirror-2




Mirror-3



RAID 51




Fast Mirroring Copy (FMC)



No data loss



Lazy Parity Backup (LPB)




No data loss



Why does fast recovery work?

- ◆ Narrowing the windows of vulnerability

■ normal ■ failed ■ replicating ■ rebuild



Reliability Analysis

◆ Assumptions

- Total data capacity: $Z = 2$ Petabytes
- $MTTF_{disk} = 10^5 \text{ -- } 10^6$ hours
- Failures of the disks are independent.
- Recovery rate: $\gamma = 100\text{GB}/\text{hour}$
- S : size of a redundancy set; D : # of disks in one RAID5

◆ Markov Models


◆ Mean-Time-To-Data-Loss (MTTDL)

$$MTTDL_{mirror\ 2} = \frac{MTTF_{disk}^2 \cdot \gamma}{2 \cdot Z} \qquad MTTDL_{mirror\ 3} = \frac{MTTF_{disk}^3 \cdot \gamma^2}{3 \cdot S \cdot Z}$$

$$MTTDL_{raid\ 51} = \frac{MTTF_{disk}^4 \cdot \gamma^3}{4 \cdot D \cdot (D - 1) \cdot S^2 \cdot Z}$$



Comparison of Reliability (log-log)



Conclusions

- ◆ Two major sources of data loss in large storage systems
 - Nonrecoverable read errors
 - Disk failures
- ◆ Reliability mechanisms
 - Signature scheme
 - Fast recovery mechanisms
 - Fast Mirroring Copy
 - Lazy Parity Backup
- ◆ Reliability analysis
 - Mirror2 w/ fast recovery can provide 30-year MTDDL.
 - Mirror3 or RAID51 w/ fast recovery can provide very high reliability.



Future Work

- ◆ More details on failure distributions
- ◆ Impacts of data placement policies on system reliability
- ◆ Data consistency schemes
- ◆ Advanced erasure coding



Acknowledgements

- ◆ Jean-Jacques Bedet -- our shepherd
- ◆ Members of the Storage System Research Center (SSRC) at the University of California, Santa Cruz
- ◆ Project sponsors
 - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
 - Los Alamos National Laboratory
 - Sandia National Laboratory
 - IBM Research
 - European Commission
 - Microsoft Research



Questions or comments?



Galois Power Signatures

- ◆ Why not SHA1?
 - Need for consistency checking in large storage systems
- ◆ Galois Field (GF) : a finite set
- ◆ Galois power signatures for a block
 - A block P has l symbols, each symbol is f bits long.

$$P = p_1 p_2 p_3 \dots p_l$$


- β : element of $GF(2^f)$
- β signature of a block $sig_{\beta}(P) = \sum_{\mu=1}^l p_{\mu} \beta^{\mu-1}$
- n-fold α -signature

$$sig_{\alpha,n}(P) = (sig_{\alpha}(P), sig_{\alpha^2}(P), \dots, sig_{\alpha^n}(P))$$




Markov Models

- ◆ 2 way mirroring




- ◆ 3 way mirroring



Markov Models (cont.)

◆ RAID 51



Related Work

- ◆ RAID: classic method for reliability and recovery
- ◆ OceanStore: designed to have a long MTTDL
- ◆ FARSITE: replica placement policies
- ◆ ROC: decrease TCO by reducing recovery time
- ◆ Muntz and Liu: disk array declustering
- ◆ Menon and Mattson: distributed sparing
- ◆ Long: consistency management for mirrored disks
- ◆ Castro and Liskov: secure replication to tolerate Byzantine faults
- ◆ Honicky and Miller: online data reorganization
- ◆ Litwin and Schwarz: a family of linear hashing models
- ◆ Schwarz: a Markov model to estimate system availability

